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In Southland v. Keating,' the United States Supreme Court held that
under certain circumstances, the Federal Arbitration Act 2 (FAA) preempts
state law concerning the enforceability of arbitration agreements.' The Su-
preme Court stated that by enacting the FAA, "Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration."
4
The question the Supreme Court left unanswered in Southland is which
FAA provisions must be applied by state courts.' Although the FAA clearly
preempts state law on the enforceability of arbitration clauses, 6 state pro-
cedural rules may still apply in enforcing arbitration agreements.' Since the
extent of preemption remains to be determined, it is important for practioners
to be aware of and review potential areas of state arbitration acts which may
be superceded by the FAA. Accordingly, a comparison of the FAA with
selected state arbitration statutes will lend practitioners some guidance in
determining the applicable law.
Alaska
Alaska has adopted an arbitration act substantially similiar to the Uni-
form Arbitration Act 8 (hereinafter "UAA"). Although the Alaska act is also
relatively similar to the FAA, the Alaska statute does contain several devia-
tions from the federal act that trigger preemption.
The first difference, and probably the most important, is that the Alaska
arbitration act does not apply to a labor-management contract unless the act
* This project was written and prepared by Missouri Law Review candidates
under the direction of Associate Editor in Chief Richard C. Petrofsky.
1. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
3. Southland, 465 U.S. at 6, 10.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 15.
6. Sections 1 and 2, which set forth the types of arbitration agreements that
will be enforced under the FAA, will be binding on state courts. Section 3 and 4,
however, are inapplicable. 465 U.S. at 16 n.10. Sections 5 through 13 contain pro-
cedural provisions that may or may not apply to state courts. See Note, Federal
Preemption of Arbitration, 1984 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 193.
7. See Note, supra n. 6.
8. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010-.180 (1983)
1
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is included in the contract or the contract provides for its application.9 The
FAA, by contrast, does not exclude labor-management contracts from its
coverage.10 Consequently, the FAA preempts the Alaska statute so that such
contracts are now included within the scope of arbitration law.
A second difference between the Alaska act and the FAA is that the
Alaska act permits the exercise of arbitration powers by a majority of the
arbitrators.' Because the FAA does not contain a similar provision, this
section of the Alaska act may be preempted by the FAA.
Differences also exist between the FAA provisions for vacating an award
and provisions on the same topic included in the Alaska act. The FAA permits
vacation when the arbitrators exceed their powers or if the arbitrators "[s]o
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made." 2 Under the Alaska arbitration act,
an award may be vacated if the arbitrators exceed their powers but not if
the arbitrators imperfectly execute that power.' 3 Another difference is that
the FAA does not contain language similar to § 09.43.120(a)(5) 4 or
§ 09.43.120(b) of the Alaska law.15 Finally, the FAA permits vacation when
a party's rights are prejudiced under 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) while the Alaska law
requires that a party's rights be substantially prejudiced in its comparable
provision contained in § 09.43.120(a)(4).' 6
Arizona
Arizona's arbitration act 7 is substantially similiar to the UAA. Although
the Arizona act is also relatively similiar to the FAA, the Arizona statute
9. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (1983). The UAA applies to agreements between
employers and employees.
10. 9 U.S.C §§ 1-14 (1982).
11. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.43.040 (1983) provides that "[tihe powers of the ar-
bitrators may be exercised by a majority unless otherwise provided by the agreement
or by AS 09.43.010- 09.43.180." The Uniform Arbitration Act also permits a majority
of the arbitrators to exercise power. UAA § 4 (1955).
12. 9 U.S.C § 10(d) (1982). The UAA does not contain similar language.
13. AiLAsKA STAT. § 09.43.120 (1983).
14. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.43.120(a)(5) (1983) provides: (Tlhere was no arbitration
agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under AS
09.43.020 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising
the objection. The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(5).
15. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.43.120(b) (1983) provides: "[the fact that the relief
is such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not
ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. The UAA contains similar
language in § 12(a)(5).
16. ALAsA STAT. § 09.43.120(a)(4) (1983) provides: "[t]he arbitrators refused
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown for postponement or
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of AS 09.43.050, as to prejudice substantially the
rights of a party." The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(4).
17. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to 1518 (1982).
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does contain several deviations from the federal act that trigger preemption.
For instance, under the Arizona law, arbitration agreements between
employers and employees are exempted from coverage." The FAA contains
no such exemption and consequently preempts Arizona law.
Arizona law permits a majority of arbitrators to exercise power. 19 The
FAA does not contain a similar provision. Accordingly, the Southland
20
decision dictates that the FAA control so that a majority of arbitrators should
not be allowed to exercise power.
Arizona's requirements for vacating arbitration awards differ from those
of the FAA. The Arizona act requires that a party's rights be substantially
prejudiced before vacation is permissible. 2' The FAA omits the word sub-
stantially in its comparable provision. 2  The Arizona act, like the FAA, allows
vacation when the arbitrators have exceeded their powers. 2 However, the
FAA also permits vacation when the arbitrators imperfectly exercise their
powers. 24 Another difference between the Arizona law and the FAA appears
in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1512(5).2 5 The FAA does not contain com-
parable language and therefore may preempt this section of the Arizona
arbitration act.
Arkansas
The Arkansas arbitration act 26 excludes from coverage personal injury
or tort matters and "any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy
or annuity contract. 2 7 None of these exclusions appears in the FAA.
18. Id.
19. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1504 (1982).
20. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
21. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1512(A)(4) (1982) provides: "[tihe arbitrators
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing,
contrary to the provisions of § 12-1505, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party." The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(4).
22. 9 U.S.C § 10(c) (1982).
23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1512(A)(3) (1982) provides: "[tlhe arbitrators
exceeded their powers." The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(3).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 10(D) (1982) provides: "[wihere the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made."
25. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1512(5) (1982) provides:
There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely deter-
mined in proceedings under § 12-1502 and the adverse party did not partic-
ipate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact
that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court
of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
26. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-511 to 532 (Supp. 1985).
27. The Arkansas statute provides in pertinent part: "[this Act [Secs. 34-511
to 532] shall have no application to personal injury or tort matters, employer-employee
1986]
3
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The Arkansas arbitration act permits a majority of the arbitrators to
exercise power. 28 Because the FAA does not permit such an exercise of power,
this part of the Arkansas act is preempted by federal law.
The FAA also preempts Arkansas law in the area of vacation of arbi-
tration awards. The Arkansas statutes do not contain the language concerning
imperfect execution of powers that appears in the FAA. 29 The Arkansas law
also requires that party's rights be prejudiced.30 Also, ARK. STAT. ANN. §
34-522(5)"' is preempted by the FAA because the FAA does not contain a
similar provision.
Colorado
Colorado's arbitration act3 2 permits a majority of the arbitrators to
exercise power while the FAA does not.33 Thus, the Southland34 decision
preempts that part of the Colorado law.
The Colorado act also differs from the FAA in the area of vacation of
arbitration awards. Under the Colorado act vacation is permitted when the
arbitrators exceed their powers35 but not in the additional circumstances out-
disputes, nor to any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity
contract." Id. at § 34-511. The UAA does not contain similar language.
28.The Arkansas statute provides that "Ithe powers of the arbitrators may be
exercised by a majority unless otherwise provided by the agreement or by this act."
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-514 (Supp. 1985). The UAA contains similar language in §
4.
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-522(a)(3) (Supp. 1985), provides: "lt)he arbitrators
exceeded their powers." The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(3). See also,
9 U.S.C § 10(D) (1982).
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-522(a)(4) (Supp. 1985) provides: "[t]he arbitrators
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing,
contrary to the provisions of Section 5 [§ 34-515] as to prejudice substantially the
rights of a party." The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(4).
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-522(5) (Supp. 1985) provides:
There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely deter-
mined in proceedings under Section 2 [§ 34-512] and the party did not
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; [b]ut the
fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by
a Court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm
the award.
Id. The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(5).
32. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to 223 (Supp. 1985).
33. Id. at § 13-22-206 provides that "[t]he powers of the arbitrators may be
exercised by a majority unless otherwise provided by the agreement or by this part
2." The UAA contains similar language in § 4.
34. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S 1 (1984).
35. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-214(l)(a)(III) (1985) provides: "[tjhe arbitrators
exceeded their powers." The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(3).
4
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lined in 9 U.S.C. § 10(d).3 6 Colorado law also requires substantial prejudice
to a party's rights37 while the FAA requires merely prejudice. Finally, the
Colorado arbitration law allows vacation in language contained in CoLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-22-214(l)(a)(V) as and § 13-22-214(1)(b).39 No similar language
is included in the FAA. Thus, Colorado law is preempted by the FAA in
these aspects of vacation of arbitration awards.
Delaware
The Delaware arbitration act,40 based on the UAA, 41 differs from the
FAA in several substantive respects. The primary difference between the two
acts relates to the coverage of each. The Delaware act covers a broader range
of agreements than is covered under the FAA. The FAA applies only to
arbitration provisions contained in maritime transactions or in contracts in-
volving commerce. 2 Moreover, the FAA is specifically limited to contracts
entered into after January 1, 1926. 43 The Delaware act contains no such
limitations and provides that any written agreement to submit to arbitration
is enforceable under that state's act."4 The Delaware act also specifically
applies to arbitration clauses contained in contracts of the state and its mu-
nicipalities.
4 5
The Delaware act applies to all arbitration agreements between employers
and employees" with one major exception for collective bargaining labor
contracts. 47 The FAA, on the other hand, covers all employment contracts
36. See 9 U.S.C § 10(D) (1982).
37. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-22-214(l)(a)(IV) (1985) provides: "[tihe arbitrators
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing,
contrary to the provisions of section 13-22-207, as to prejudice substantially the rights
of a party." The U.A.A contains similar language in § 12(a)(4).
38. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-22-214(I)(A)(V) (Supp. 1985) provides: "[tjhere
was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in pro-
ceedings under section 13-22-204 and the party did not participate in the arbitration
hearing without raising objection." The UAA contains similar language in § 12(a)(5).
39. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-214(l)(b) (Supp. 1985) provides:
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), the fact
that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law
or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award." The U.A.A
contains similar language in § 12(a)(5).
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1974).
41. The Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act is identical in all substantive re-
spects to the UAA.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
43. Id. § 14.
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701 (1974).
45. Id. §§ 5723, 5724.
46. Id. § 5701.
47. Id. § 5725.
19861
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except contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 48 Even after the
exceptions, many employment contract arbitration agreements would be cov-
ered by both the FAA and the state arbitration statute.
Although appointment of arbitrators is virtually identical under both
acts, the FAA specifies that unless otherwise agreed, the arbitration shall be
conducted by a single arbitrator.4 9 The Delaware act states that the court
shall appoint one or more arbitrators" and that the majority of arbitrators
will govern any action to be taken."
Finally, Delaware's act contains several provisions for which there are
no corresponding provisions inthe FAA. For example, § 57180 of the Del-
aware act provides that a confirmed award shall become a lien on all real
estate of the debtor in the county where the arbitration award was made.1
2
The act also contains a provision dealing with the death or incompetency of
a party to the arbitration. 3 In all other respects the acts are similar.
District of Columbia
The District of Columbia virtually adopted the UAA.14 The main dif-
ference between the FAA and the District of Columbia's arbitration act is
the agreements which each act covers. The FAA is limited to transactions
involving maritime matters and to contracts which involve commerce." In
addition, the FAA is specifically limited to contracts entered into after Jan-
uary 1, 1926.16 The D.C. act applies to all written agreements which contain
arbitration provisions.5 7 Moreover, the two acts have different provisions
concerning their application to employment contracts. Section 1 of the FAA
excludes from coverage contracts of employment involving seamen, railroad
employees, or workers engaged in interstate commerce. 8 In contrast, § 16-
4301 of the D.C. act specifically provides that the act extends to contracts
between employers and employees or between their representatives.. 9
Although the appointment of arbitrators is similar under both acts, the
FAA provides that unless otherwise agreed, a single arbitrator shall conduct
48. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
49. Id. § 5.
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5704 (1974).
51. Id. § 5705.
52. Id. § 5718.
53. Id. § 5722.
54. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 to -4319 (1981). The District of Columbia
arbitration act is identical in all substantive respects to the UAA.
55. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
56. Id. § 14.
57. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4301 (1981).
58. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
59. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4301 (1981).
[Vol. 1986
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the arbitration. 60 The D.C. act specifies that the court shall appoint one or
more arbitrators6 and that a majority will control any action taken. 62
Finally, the D.C. act contains some provisions for which there are no
corresponding provisions in the FAA. Section 16-4302 provides for a stay of
arbitration on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. 63 The D.C.
act also establishes requirements for awards and permits the arbitrator to
change the award." There are no similar provisions under the FAA.
Florida
Florida has substantially adopted the UAA.65 The primary difference in
the FAA and the Florida arbitration code is the the agreements covered by
each. The Florida code covers all written agreements containing provisions
to submit any controversy to arbitration, provided that the parties have not
stipulated that the state statute will not govern.66 The FAA, on the other
hand, applies only to arbitration provisions contained in maritime transac-
tions or in contracts involving commerce, 67 and is specifically limited to
contracts executed after January 1, 1926.68 However, because of the broad
applicability of the state code and the inclusive nature of the FAA limitations,
most arbitration agreements will be covered by both acts.
The Flordia act contains a provision for an umpire in addition to ar-
bitrators. The umpire has the same powers as the arbitrator but would not
be counted in the making of the award unless the arbitrators failed to agree. 69
The FAA specifies that unless otherwise agreed, the arbitration shall be
conducted by a single arbitrator. 70 In addition to an umpire, the Florida code
refers to the appointment of arbitrators, 71 and provides that a majority of
the arbitrators will control. 72 Under the FAA, there is no mention of the use
of such umpires in the arbitration.
The Florida act also provides for a stay of arbitration on a showing that
there is no agreement to arbitrate; 73 establishes the requirements for awards;
74
60. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
61. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4303 (1981).
62. Id. § 16-4304.
63. Id. § 16-4302.
64. Id. § 16-4309.
65. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-22 (1984).
66. Id. § 682.02.
67. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
68. Id. § 14.
69. FLA. STAT. § 682.04 (1984).
70. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
71. FLA. STAT. § 682.04 (1984).
72. Id. § 682.05.
73. Id. § 682.03.
74. Id. § 682.09.
19861
7
et al.: Federal Arbitration Act Comparison
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
and permits the arbitrator to change the award. 7" No such provisions are
contained in the FAA.
The final inconsistency is that the state act contains a severability pro-
vision. If a provision is found invalid then it will not affect the application
of any of the other state act provisions.7 6 Moreover, the severability provision
provides that any section of the act is to be classified as substantive for
conflict of laws purposes and would thus be applicable in other states.7
Idaho
The Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act is identical to the UAA except the
Idaho act does not adopt the final three sections of the UAA. 78 The major
difference between the Idaho act and the FAA is in the agreements covered
by each act. The FAA is limited to transactions involving maritime matters
and to contracts that involve commerce 9 and which are executed after Jan-
uary 1, 1926. 0 The Idaho act covers all written agreements which contain
arbitration clauses."' Moreover, the Idaho act is much broader in its coverage
of employment contracts. The Idaho act applies to all agreements between
employers and employees unless otherwise provided 2 Under the FAA, con-
tracts of employment involving seamen, railroad employees, or workers en-
gaged in interstate commerce are excluded from coverage. 3 Due to the inclusive
nature of any limitations, however, most arbitration agreements will be cov-
ered by both acts.
The Idaho act contains several provisions for which there are no cor-
responding FAA provisions. Section 7-902 of the Idaho act provides for a
stay of arbitration upon a showing that there was no agreement to arbitrate.8 4
The act also establishes requirements for awards85 and permits the arbitrator
to change the award. 6
Finally, the FAA states that unless otherwise agreed, the arbitration shall
be conducted by a single arbitrator.8 7 The Idaho code refers to the appoint-
ment of one or more arbitrators8 with the majority to govern any action to
be taken8 9 In all other substantive respects, the two acts are similar.
75. Id. § 682.10.
76. Id. § 682.22.
77. Id.
78. IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (1978).
79. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
80. Id. § 14.
81. IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1978).
82. Id.
83. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
84. IDAHO CODE § 7-902 (1978).
85. Id. § 7-908.
86. Id. § 7-909.
87. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
88. IDAHO CODE § 7-903 (1978).
89. Id. § 7-904.
[Vol. 1986
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Illinois
Illinois has adopted an arbitration act substantially similiar to the UAA. 90
The Illinois act provides that written agreements to submit to arbitration are
"valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist for the
revocation of any contract." 91 This language is similar to that used in § 2
of the FAA; however, Illinois does not limit the application of its arbitration
act to contracts involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions. 92
The FAA might preempt three provisions of the Illinois arbitration act.
The Illinois act provides as follows:
[a]ny agreement between a patient and a hospital or health care provider to
submit to binding arbitration a claim for damages arising out of (1) injuries
alleged to have been received by a patient, or (2) death of a patient, due to
hospital or health care provider negligence or other wrongful act, but not
including intentional torts, is also subject to the Health Care Arbitration
Act.93
To the extent that this exception creates an additional burden or limitation
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements, it would be preempted by
the FAA for arbitration agreements within the federal act.
The Illinois act outlines the procedures for the appointment of arbitra-
tors and provides that "[iif the method of appointment of arbitrators is not
specified in the agreement and cannot be agreed upon by the parties, the
entire arbitration agreement is terminated." 94 The FAA provides for ap-
pointment of arbitrators by the court if a method is not specified in the
agreement or if the method agreed upon fails. 95 The Illinois code section
permitting termination of the agreement is in direct conflict with the FAA
and therefore would be preempted by the federal act if the arbitration clause
fell within its provisions.
The third limitation imposed by the Illinois legislature provides that the
act applies only to agreements made subsequent to August 24, 1961. 96 It is
possible that the FAA would preempt the Illinois statute if the enforcement
of an applicable arbitration agreement would otherwise be prevented.
Illinois has several provisions in its arbitration act which are not con-
90. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.10, §§ 101-123 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1985).
91. Id. § 101 (similar in effect to § 1 of the UAA).
92. The UAA does not limit its application to contracts involving interstate
commerce or maritime transactions.
93. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 101 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp 1985). The UAA
does not contain any similar exception.
94. Id. § 103. Section 3 of the UAA provides for court appointment of
arbitrators if there is no method provided in the agreement or if the agreed method
fails.
95. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
96. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 119 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1985). Section
20 of the UAA utilizes similar language.
19861
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tained within the FAA including: conduct of hearings, 97 represenation by an
attorney, 98 the use of depositions, 99 fees and expenses,' °° venue,' 0' appeals,
10 2
and severability. 03 These provisions will probably be given effect by the state
courts regardless of whether the FAA applies, because they do not limit the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.'°0
Indiana
The Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act'05 provides that written agreements
to submit to arbitration are "valid and enforceable save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 6 The FAA
utilizes similar language, but imposes an additional requirement that the
contract involve an interstate commerce or maritime transaction. 0 7 The In-
diana act provides specifically that it "applies to arbitration agreements be-
tween employers and employees or between their respective representatives
(unless otherwise provided in the agreement)."'' 08
The Indiana act "specifically exempts from its coverage all consumer
leases, sales and loan contracts."' 9 The FAA does not contain any similar
limitation. The FAA would preempt this state exception with regard to ap-
plicable contracts because the limitation would constitute an impermissible
additional burden on the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
The Indiana act outlines the circumstances under which a court may
stay arbitration:
If the court determines that there are other issues between the parties which
are not subject to arbitration and which are the subject of a pending action
... and that a determination of such issues is likely to make the arbitration
unnecessary, the court may delay its order to arbitrate until the determination
of such other issues." 0
97. ILL. ANN. STAT. (same as section 5 of the UAA).
98. Id. § 106 (same as § 6 of the UAA).
99. Id. § 107 (same as § 7 of the UAA).
100. Id. § 110 (same as § 10 of the UAA).
101. Id. § 117 (same as § 18 of the UAA).
102. Id. § 118 ("appeals may be taken in the same manner, upon the same
terms, and with like effect as in civil cases"). UAA § 19 outlines the specific orders
and judgments from which an appeal may be taken.
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 121 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1985) (same as
§ 22 of the UAA).
104. See, Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Note, supra note 6, at 196.
105. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-2-1 to -2-22 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1985).
106. Id. § 34-4-2-1 (follows the language of § 1 of the UAA).
107. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
108. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-1 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1985) (same as § 1 of
the UAA).
109. Id. § 34-4-2-1(b). The UAA does not contain any similar exception.
110. Id. § 34-4-2-3. The UAA does not provide any similar reason for a stay
[Vol. 1986
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The FAA does not offer any similar grounds for staying or delaying arbi-
tration. Although this section appears procedural, it is possible this provision
could be viewed as contrary to the "national policy favoring arbitration.""'
The Indiana statute also includes a section which provides that the act
"applies only to agreements made subsequent to August 18, 1969." ' 1 2 The
FAA applies to agreements made after January 1, 1926.113 It is possible that
the FAA would preempt the state statute if the longer time period provided
under the federal act would allow an otherwise valid arbitration agreement
to be enforced. "In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." ,
4
The Indiana Arbitration Act has several provisions not contained in the
FAA. Some of the additional areas include: conduct of the hearing," 5 rep-
resentation by an attorney," 6 use of depositions," 7 fees and expenses," 8 venue" 9
and appeals. 20 These sections appear to be procedural provisions, and they
should not be preempted as long as they do not "create an obstacle to ...
the national policy favoring arbitration."' 2'
Kansas
The Kansas Uniform Arbitration Act 22 provides that written agreements
to submit to arbitration are "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."' 2 This language is also used in § 2 of the FAA. The Kansas act,
or delay of arbitration.
111. See, Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
112. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-20 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1985) (similar to § 20
of the UAA).
113. 9 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
114. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
115. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-6 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1985). This section is
similar to § 5 of the UAA, however, it requires thirty days notice prior to the hearing,
it allows a party to "require that the hearing be recorded in a manner sufficient for
appeal," and does not specifically provide for the right to cross-examine witnesses
appearing at the hearing. Id.
116. Id. § 34-4-2-7 (same as § 6 of the UAA).
117. Id. § 34-4-2-8. This section on depositions is similar to § 7 of the UAA.
With regard to subpoenas, however, the Indiana statute excludes subpoenas "for the
production of the financial books, financial records or documents pertaining to the
income or financial condition of the other party" in matters of arbitration between
labor and management. Id.
118. Id. § 34-4-2-11 (similar to § 10 of the UAA).
119. Id. § 34-4-2-18 (similar to § 18 of the UAA).
120. Id. § 34-4-2-19 (same as § 19 of the UAA).
121. Note, supra note 6, at 196.
122. KANe. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (1982).
123. Id. § 5-401. UAA § 1 utilizes the same language.
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however, does not limit its application to contracts involving interstate com-
merce or maritime transactions.
124
The Kansas legislature imposed several limitations on the validity and
application of their arbitration act. The Kansas act specifically exempts in-
surance contracts from the coverage of the act. 25 These sections should not
be preempted by the FAA because the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that
"[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supercede
any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance
''126
The Kansas act also excludes contracts "between an employer and em-
ployees or between their respective representatives" from its definition of
valid and enforceable arbitration agreements.127 The FAA specifically exempts
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."' 12 Assuming that a
particular contract is subject to the FAA, the employment contract exclusion
adopted by Kansas might be preempted to the extent that it is broader than
the FAA exemption. The states cannot impose additional limits on the en-
forceability of arbitration clauses which are subject to the FAA.129
Kansas also excludes claims in tort from coverage under the arbitration
act. 130 If the contract containing the arbitration agreement is subject to the
FAA and the clause itself is broad enough to cover the claim, the FAA will
preempt the state statute and require the court to enforce the arbitration
agreement. 131
The Kansas statute provides that "this act applies only to agreements
made subsequent to the taking effect of this act" on July 1, 1973.132 The
FAA provides that it "shall not apply to contracts made prior to January
1, 1926."33 The Kansas statute would probably be preempted if the contract
124. The UAA does not limit its application to contracts involving interstate
commerce or maritime transactions.
125. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -419 (1982). The UAA does not exclude
insurance contracts from its coverage.
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982); Note, supra 6, at 198.
127. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1982). Section 1 of the UAA specifically in-
cludes "arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their
respective representatives (unless otherwise provided in the agreement)." UAA § 1
(1955).
128. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
129. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
130. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5.401 (1982). The UAA does not exclude tort claims
from its coverage.
131. Note, supra note 6, at 197-98.
132. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-419 (1982). Section 20 of the UAA utilizes the same
language.
133. 9 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
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was subject to the FAA and was entered into within the time permitted by
the federal act. "In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." 
134
The Kansas Uniform Arbitration Act has several provisions not con-
tained within the FAA; these areas include: conduct of hearings, 35 represen-
tation by an attorney, 3 6 use of depositions,3 7 fees and expenses, 31 venue, 3 9
appeals,'"4 and severability.' 4' It is likely that these provisions could be given
effect even if the arbitration agreements are subject to the FAA because they
are largely procedural and do not appear to inhibit "the national policy
favoring arbitration."' 42
Maine
The Maine Uniform Arbitration Act 1 3 provides that a written agreement
to submit to arbitration is "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.'" 44 This is the same language as that found in the FAA. 145 Unlike the
federal act, however, Maine niether limits application of its act to contracts
involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions, nor does it exclude
any classes of employment contracts.'46
The Maine Arbitration Act provides that it "shall not apply to any
provision contained in a policy of automobile liability insurance for arbitra-
tion of a claim under the uninsured motorist coverage.' ' 47 Although this
provision probably constitutes an "additional limitation" on the enforcea-
134. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
135. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-405 (1982- (follows the language of section 5 of the
UAA, except the Kansas statute allows a party to make a special appearance at the
hearing to "contest the sufficiency of notice").
136. Id. § 5-406 (same as § 6 of UAA).
137. Id. § 5-407 (similar to § 7 of UAA, except that the Kansas statute does
not expressly limit depositions "for use as evidence ... of a witness who cannot be
subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing").
138. Id. § 5-410 (same as § 10 of UAA).
139. Id. § 5-417 (same as § 18 of UAA).
140. Id. § 5-418 (same as § 19 of UAA).
141. Id. § 5-421 (same as the § 19 of UAA).
142. See Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
143. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (1964).
144. Id. § 5927.
145. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
146. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (1964) specifically provides that "this
chapter also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and employees or
between their respective representatives, unless otherwise provided in the agreement."
This follows the same language of § 1 of the UAA.
147. Id. § 5948. The UAA does not contain a similar exception.
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bility of arbitration agreements, it should not be preempted. This is because
the McCarron-Ferguson Act provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by any state
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance.' 1148
. The Maine Arbitration Act also provides that "this chapter applies only
to agreements made subsequent to October 7, 1967."' 4 9 The FAA, on the
other hand, is applicable to contracts made subsequent to January 1, 1926.150
It is possible that the state statute would be preempted if the effective date
of the Maine Arbitration Act was set up as a bar to enforcement of an
arbitration clause within the provisions of the FAA. States cannot impose
additional limits on the enforceability of arbitrations agreements subject to
the FAA.151
There are several sections in the Maine arbitration act which are not
contained in the FAA. Some of these include: conduct of the hearings,1
2
representation by an attorney,'53 use of depositions, 5 4 fees and expenses,'
venue' 156 and appeals.'57 These areas focus primarily on the method of en-
forcement of arbitration agreements, and therefore should not be preempted
by the FAA.""
Maryland
The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act specifically states that the court
should make any determination provided for without a jury. 19 Under the
FAA, the party alleged to be in default may demand a jury trial on the
issue. 60 The court then must refer this issue to a jury in the manner provided
for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or specially call a jury for that
purpose.' 6' The jury findings will direct that the arbitration proceedings be
148. 15 U.S.C. § § 1011-1015 (1982). See, Note, supra note 6, at 198.
149. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5946 (1964- (similar to section 20 of the
UAA).
150. 9 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
151. See Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
152. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5931 (1964) (same as section 5 of the
UAA).
153. Id. § 5932 (same as § 6 of the UAA).
154. Id. § 5933 (same as § 7 of the UAA).
155. Id. § 5936 (same as § 10 of the UAA).
156. Id. § 5944 (differs from § 18 of the UAA only in that it provides that
"application shall be made to the Superior Court of the county").
157. Id. § 5945 (same as § 19 of the UAA).
158. See Note, supra note 6, at 196.
159. MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-204 (1957). The UAA allows the
court to decide this issue summarily.
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dismissed, or will direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration. 162 Under
the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, these determinations are made by
the court. 163
The Maryland act does not apply to arbitration between employers and
employees unless it is specifically provided in the agreement.'" The FAA
does not apply to contracts of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 165 However, case law
indicates that the FAA is, indeed, applicable to labor contracts which do not
fall into these exceptions.' 66
Both a stay of arbitration and a stay of proceedings are provided for
in the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act. 67 Section 3 of the FAA allows a
stay of the proceedings if the court is satisfied that the issue involved is
referable to arbitration under the agreement. 68 The stay can only be had
when the "applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.' 169 There is no reference in the FAA to a stay of arbitration.
However, the FAA does provide for a stay of the proceedings when the
disputed issue is referable to arbitration. 170
Massachusetts
Section 2 of the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act allows the court
to determine the issue of existence of an agreement to arbitrate.' 71 The court
may stay an arbitration proceeding if it finds that there is no agreement to
arbitrate. 7 2 If an issue which is referable to arbitration is involved in a
pending court proceeding, the aggrieved party may petition the court for an
order directing arbitration. 173 Following the petition, the proceeding shall be
stayed. 74 By contrast, the FAA provides for a jury to determine the existence
162. Id.
163. MD. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-207 (1957). Section 2 of the UAA
also provides that the court will make these determinations.
164. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-206(6) (1957). Section 1 of the
UAA applies to arbitration agreements between employers and employees.
165. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
166. See, e.g., Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3rd Cir. 1948).
167. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-208 to -209 (1957). The UAA
also provides for a stay of the arbitration and the proceedings in § 2(b) and (d),
respectively.
168. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2 (a) (West Supp. 1960). Section 2
of the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act is identical to § 2 of the UAA.
172. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2(b) (1960).
173. Id. § 2(c).
174. Id. § 2(d).
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of a valid agreement to arbitrate. 75 While the FAA allows a stay of the
proceedings when an issue therein is referable to arbitration, the FAA does
not provide for a stay of arbitration.1 76
Michigan
The Michigan Arbitration Act does not apply to collective bargaining
contracts between employers and employees which deal with terms or con-
ditions of employment. 177 The FAA specifically does not apply to "contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.' 78
Under Michigan law, if either party fails to appear for arbitration after
due notice, the arbitrators can hear and determine the issue upon evidence
presented by the other party. 79 The language of the FAA seems to assume
that both parties are present in the proceedings. 180 Section 4 provides for five
days notice in writing served on a party in default."" After notice, the court
shall hear the parties on the issue of an agreement to arbitration.
8 2
Minnesota
Minnesota arbitration agreements apply to contracts between employers
and employees. '8 The FAA does not apply to contracts concerning employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce.8
The Minnesota law allows the court to decide whether there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate. 85 The FAA provides that a party may demand a jury
trial as to this issue.8 6 While the Minnesota Arbitration Act provides for a
stay of arbitration on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate,8 7
175. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
176. Id. § 3.
177. MICH. Coyn'. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(3) (1963). The UAA does apply to
arbitration agreements between employers and employees.
178. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
179. MICH. Comap. LAWS ANN. § 600.5011 (1963). The UAA makes no provision
for a defaulting party.
180. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (West Supp. 1957). This is consistent with
UAA § 1.
184. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
185. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.09 (West Supp. 1957). Section 2 of the UAA is
virtually identical to the Minnesota Statute.
186. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
187. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.09 (1957).
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The Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act' 89 provides that written arbitra-
tion agreements are "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 9
Similar language is used in the FAA.' 9' The Missouri act, however, excludes
arbitration of insurance contracts and adhesion contracts. 192 The FAA would
not preempt Missouri's prohibition of arbitration under an insurance contract
because such a preemption would amount to an invalidation of a "law en-
acted by [a] state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance
.... " and hence, contrary to the proposition enunciated in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. 93 Missouri's exclusion of adhesion contracts would presum-
ably be preempted by the FAA, unless some ground could be found for the
revocation of the agreement according to ordinary rules of contract law.
The Missouri act limits its applicability to "written agreements between
commercial persons, or between such persons and those with whom they
contract other than commercial persons."' 94 The exclusion of contracts in-
volving other than maritime transactions may be an area in which the FAA
would preempt the Missouri act, since the effect serves to limit the scope of
arbitrable agreements available under the FAA.
In addition, the Missouri act requires written notice that the contract
contains an arbitration clause. 95 To the extent that an arbitration agreement
subject to the FAA would not be enforced due to the lack of such a notice,
that limitation would be preempted by the FAA.196
188. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
189. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (Supp. 1983).
190. Id. § 435.350.
191. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
192. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.350 (Supp. 1983). This provision does not, however,
exempt contracts which warrant new homes against defects in construction from being
considered adhesion contracts or insurance contracts for the purposes of the Missouri
Act. Id.
193. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[N]o Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair or supercede any law enacted by any state for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance . . ." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
194. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.465 (Supp. 1983). The UAA is not limited to
transactions involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions.
195. Id. § 435.460.
196. If the FAA applies, it will preempt state statutes that not only forbid
arbitration of specified subjects, but also those that hinder their enforcement.
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The Missouri act contains provisions for venue' 97 and appeals procedure ' "a
which are not found in the FAA. Presumably, these provisions would be
given effect by state courts even though the arbitration agreement is subject
to the FAA because they do not constitute an additional limitation to the
enforceability of those agreements to arbitrate.
Nevada
The Nevada Uniform Arbitration Act199 provides that written arbitration
agreements are "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ' ' 200 Though
this same language is used in the FAA, 20 1 the Nevada act, like the UAA, 20 2
extends coverage beyond contracts involving interstate commerce or maritime
transactions to contracts "between employers and employees or between their
respective representatives unless otherwise provided in the agreement. ' 20 3 Since
this is not an imposition of restrictions on the enforceability of arbitration
clauses which are subject to the FAA, this provision would not be preempted
by the federal statute.
The Nevada act generally follows the FAA with a few exceptions. The
Nevada act includes a provision for discovery which is absent in the FAA. 204
Also included in the Nevada act are provisions for arbitration in cases of
damages arising out of the "ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle. ' 20 5 Although not found in the FAA, these provisions would not be
preempted since they do not create obstacles to the enforcement of arbitration
clauses.
Also included in the Nevada act are guidelines for the establishment by
district courts of a voluntary or mandatory program for the arbitration of
civil disputes. 20 This provision, although absent from the FAA, does not
operate to restrict the enforceability of arbitration agreements and would
therefore not be preempted.
New Mexico
The New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act20 7 provides that a written
agreement to submit disputes to arbitration is "valid, enforceable and irrev-
197. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.435 (Supp. 1983).
198. Id. § 435.440.
199. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.015-.255 (1979)
200. Id. § 38.035.
201. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
202. UAA § 1 (1955).
203. NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.035 (1979).
204. Id. § 38.087.
205. Id. § 38.215-.245.
206. Id. § 38.235.
207. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -7-22 (1978).
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ocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."20 Though this same language is found in the FAA, 2°9 New
Mexico does not limit the application of its act to contracts involving inter-
state commerce and maritime transactions, nor does it exclude any classes
of employment contracts.
210
The New Mexico act is substantially similar to the UAA, and neither
provides that a party may demand a jury trial as to summary proceedings
in the disposition of issues relating to the making or performance of an
arbitration agreement, as does the FAA. 21' In addition, the New Mexico act
provides for stays of arbitration, 2 2 establishes requirements for an award,
2 3
and permits arbitrators to change an award, 21 4 none of which are found in
the FAA. However, it is likely that these provisions will be given effect in
state courts as long as they do not create an obstacle to "the national policy
favoring arbitration. " 21 5
North Carolina
The North Carolina Arbitration Act 21 6 provides that written agreements
to submit disputes to arbitration are "valid, enforceable and irrevocable
except with the consent of all the parties, without regard to the justiciable
character of the controversy. "217 Although this provision is similar to the
FAA, 2 18 the North Carolina act does not limit its application to contracts
involving interstate commerce and maritime transactions.2 1 9 The North Car-
olina act provides two exceptions to which it will not apply: (1) Any agree-
ment or provision to arbitrate in which it is stipulated that it will not apply
and (2) Arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between
their respective representatives, unless the agreement provides otherwise.
220
If the FAA were applicable to the arbitration agreement, the employment
208. Id. § 44-7-1.
209. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
210. The UAA does not limit its application to contracts involving interstate
commerce or maritime transactions, and specifically states its applicability to em-
ployment contracts. UAA § 1 (1955).
211. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
212. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-2 (1978).
213. Id. § 44-7-8.
214. Id. § 44-7-9.
215. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
216. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to 1-567.20 (1983).
217. Id. at § 1-567.2.
218. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
219. The UAA does not limit its application to contracts involving interstate
commerce or maritime transactions.
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2 (1983). The UAA § 1 specifically includes
"arbitration agreements between employers and employees, or between their respec-
tive representatives, unless otherwise provided in the agreement." UAA § 1 (1955).
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exclusion provision adopted by the North Carolina act might be preempted
to the extent that it is broader than the FAA exemption which includes
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. ' ' 221
The North Carolina act has several provisions not contained in the FAA.
These provisions include: representation by an attorney,22 fees and ex-
penses, 223 and appeals procedure. 224 It is likely that these provisions would
be given effect even if the arbitration agreement were subject to the FAA
because they are largely procedural and do not appear to inhibit the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements.
Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act 225 does not apply "to collective
bargaining agreements or contracts with reference to insurance except for
those contracts between insurance companies. '2 6 Both provisions are valid
despite their limiting effect on arbitration agreements. The exemption for
collective bargaining agreements is similar to language found in the FAA. 227
The insurance exemption remains valid under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,22 1
which specifically leaves to states the business of regulating provisions in
insurance contracts. 229
Unlike the FAA, the Oklahoma statute applies only to agreements made
after Oct. 1, 1978.23o The FAA applies to all contracts made since Jan. 1,
1926.231 Because the Southland decision did not indicate whether the FAA
221. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.7 (1983).
223. Id. § 1-567.11.
224. Id. § 1-567.18.
225. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (Supp. 1987).
226. Id. § 802. This language differs from that found in the UAA, which
makes arbitration agreements in employment contracts valid and enforceable. See
UAA § 1 (1955).
227. See supra note 6.
228. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
229. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was Congress' response to United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The act provides: "[N]o Act
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted
by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance... unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance. . . ." When state law does not
preclude arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, the FAA would give effect to the
clauses. Cf. Miller v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.
1979).
230. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 818 (Supp. 1987). Oct. 1, 1978 was the
effective date of the Act. This is consistent with language found in the UAA.
231. 9 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
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would preempt state procedural provisions, it remains unclear whether the
FAA would apply to pre-1978 agreements.
Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act 232 calls for statutory arbitra-
tion rules to apply only if "the agreement to arbitrate is in writing and
expressly provides for" statutory arbitration. 23 Otherwise, "an agreement to
arbitrate a controversy on a nonjudicial basis shall be conclusively presumed
to be an agreement to arbitrate" under common law arbitration rules .234 An
exception to these rules occurs when the government is a party to a contract
that calls for arbitration of controversies. 235 In that case, statutory arbitration
rules apply whether or not specific mention of such was made in the con-
tract.2
3 6
One other idiosyncrasy in the Pennsylvania statute calls for special ju-
dicial review of an award in three situations: first, if the commonwealth
government is a party to arbitration; second, if any political subdivision
submits to arbitration a controversy with employees; and third, if the law
requires any person to submit a controversy to arbitration. 237 In each case,
the court must review the award and modify or correct it if, had it been a
jury verdict, the court would have entered a different judgment or a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.238
232. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon 1982).
233. Id. § 7302(a).
234. Id. The common law arbitration rules are codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7341-7342 (Purdon 1982). Section 7341 states:
The award of an arbitrator in a nonjudicial arbitration which is not subject
to Subchapter A (relating to statutory arbitration) or a similar statute reg-
ulating nonjudicial arbitration proceedings is binding and may not be vacated
or modified unless it is clearly shown that a party was denied a hearing or
that fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity caused the rendition
of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award.
Id.
Judicial review of an arbitration award under common law rules is more narrow
than under the statutory rules, which are modeled after the UAA. Presumbably the
common law arbitration rules still would apply after Southland, given the national
policy in favor of enforcement of arbitration agreements.
235. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7302(c) (Purdon 1982).
236. Id.
237. Id. § 7302(d). The UAA has no similar provision.
238. Id. Modification or vacation of the award is mandated when the award
is issued due to the arbitrator's misapplication of the law. See Ragin v. Royal Globe
Ins. Co., 315 Pa. Super. 179, 461 A.2d 856 (1983). Since the review called for in
this section is of the award and not of the actual agreement to arbitrate, there remains
some question whether the FAA would preempt this provision in a state arbitration
act. At least one court says "no." See Hilton Constr. Co. v. Martin Mechanical
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South Carolina
The South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act 23 9 calls for enforcement of
arbitration agreements, but only if a prominently-displayed notice warns
contracting parties of the binding effect of arbitration clauses. 240 Since ab-
sence of the required notice would render the arbitration clause unenforce-




The act also is inapplicable to "pre-agreements" entered into between
lawyers and clients or doctors and patients. 242 Although this clause limits the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, at least one case held that the prac-
tice of medicine falls outside the commerce clause.2 43 Thus, the FAA would
not take precedent over this state provision.
The act does not apply to personal injury claims, whether based on
contract or tort, or to any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy
or annuity contract. 244 If the personal injury claim arose under a contract
involving interstate commerce with an arbitration clause broad enough to
cover the claim, arbitration would be available under the FAA. 245 If the claim
was based on tort, the FAA would not preempt the provision. 246 The insur-
ance exemption remains valid under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which spe-
cifically leaves to states the business of regulating provisions in insurance
contracts.
247
Contractors, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 40, 303 S.E.2d 119 (1983), aff'd on other grounds,
251 Ga. 701, 308 S.E.2d 830 (1983).
239. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
240. Id. § 15-48-10(a). The notice provision states: "Notice that a contract is
subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in underlined capital
letters, or rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract and unless
such notice is displayed thereon the contract shall not be subject to arbitration." Id.
Missouri and Texas have similar provisions. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.460 (Supp.
1985); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 224-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The UAA contains
no similar language.
241. Cf. Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 998-99 (8th Cir.
1972) (refusing to apply Texas statute requiring an arbitration clause be signed by
the parties' attorneys before it is valid).
242. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). The UAA
has no similar provision.
243. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103 (D. Or.
1950), aff'd, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
244. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). The UAA
has no similar provision.
245. Since the FAA applies to contracts relating to interstate commerce, it also
could possibly apply to personal injury claims arising under such a contract despite
contrary language in the state statute.
246. The FAA applies only to contracts relating to interstate commerce and
maritime transactions. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Thus, it would not preempt a state statute
concerning personal injury claims based on tort.
247. See supra note 229.
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Unlike the FAA, the South Carolina statute applies only to agreements
made after May 8, 1978.248 The FAA applies to all contracts made since Jan.
1, 1926.249 Because the Southland decision did not indicate whether the FAA
would preempt state procedural provisions, it remains unclear whether the
FAA would apply to pre-1978 agreements.
South Dakota
The South Dakota Uniform Arbitration Act 250 provides that arbitration
agreements are valid, enforceable and irrevocable, including agreements be-
tween employers and employees. 25 Although the FAA does not apply to
certain types of employment contracts, the more inclusive state act should
control as a matter of public policy.
The South Dakota act applies only to agreements made subsequent to
June 30, 1971,212 while the FAA applies to all contracts made since Jan 1,
1926 .23 The Southland decision did not make clear whether this FAA pro-
vision would preempt state law.
The South Dakota act does not apply to insurance policies, and makes
all arbitration clauses in insurance policies void and unenforceable. 254 This
exemption is valid, since the McCarran-Ferguson Act leaves to states the
business of regulating provisions in insurance contracts.2 5
Tennessee
The Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act256 provides that written agree-
ments to submit to arbitration are "valid, enforceable and irrevocable save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. ' 25 7 This is the same language as that used in § 2 of the FAA.
Tennessee, however, does not limit the application of its arbitration act to
contracts involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions.258
248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-210 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). May 8, 1978 was
the effective date of the statute. This is consistent with language found in the UAA.
249. 9 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
250. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (1979).
251. Id. § 21-25A-1. The UAA contains similar language.
252. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25A-2 (1979). June 30, 1971 was the
.effective date of the act. The UAA has a similar provision.
253. 9 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
254. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25A-3 (1979). The UAA has no similar
provision.
255. See supra note 229.
256. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-301 to -320 (Supp. 1986).
257. Id. § 29-5-302(a). Section 1 of the UAA utilizes the same language. UAA
§ 1 (1955).
258. The UAA does not limit its application to contracts involving interstate
commerce or maritime transactions.
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The Tennessee act imposes an additional requirement on some arbitra-
tion agreements: "for contracts relating to farm property, structures or goods,
or to property and structures utilized as a residence of a party, the clause
providing for arbitration shall be additionally signed or initialed by the par-
ties." ' 25 9 This limitation would be preempted if the contract fell within the
provisions of the FAA. A state court could not hold that the lack of addi-
tional signatures or initials barred enforcement of the arbitration agree-
ment.
260
The Tennessee act contains several provisions not covered by the FAA.
These provisions focus primarily on methods of enforcement and include:
conduct of hearings, 26' representation by an attorney, 262 use of depositions,
263
venue 64 and the right of appeal. 265 Presumably, these state provisions would
be given effect by the state courts even if the arbitration clause is subject to




The Texas Arbitration Act 267 does not apply to collective bargaining
agreements between an employer and a labor union.26 The FAA does not
apply to contracts for employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 269
In Texas state court, no agreement shall be arbitrated unless notice that
the contract is subject to arbitration is typed in underlined capital letters, or
rubber-stamped prominently on the first page of the contract. 270 There is no
such language in the FAA, which requires only a written provision to settle
a controversy by arbitration. 27'
Article 225 of the Texas General Arbitration Act allows the court to
259. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302(a) (Supp. 1986). The UAA does not require
that arbitration clauses be additionally signed or initialed.
260. Note, supra note 6 at 198-99.
261. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-306 (Supp. 1986) (follows the exact language
of § 5 of the UAA).
262. Id. § 29-5-307 (follows the exact language of § 6 of the UAA).
263. Id. § 29-5-308(b) (follows the exact language of UAA § 7(b) (1955)).
264. Id. § 29-5-318 (follows the exact language of UAA § 18 (1955)).
265. Id. § 29-5-319 (follows the exact language of UAA § 19 (1955)).
266. See Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
267. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224 to 386 (Vernon 1973).
268. Id. art. 224 (Vernon 1973). Section 1 of the UAA indicates that it applies
to employment contracts. UAA § 1 (1955).
269. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
270. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987). This require-
ment is not included in the UAA.
271. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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summarily determine the issue of a valid agreement to arbitrate. 272 Under the
FAA, the defaulting party may request a jury for this determination. 273 The
Texas act provides for both a stay of arbitration and a stay of the proceedings
when there is a question of arbitrability.
274
Wyoming
The Wyoming Uniform Arbitration Act 275 provides for the enforcement
of a written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to ar-
bitration, including arbitration agreements between employers and employ-
ees. 276 The FAA does not apply to certain types of employment contracts,
so the state act presumably would control. 277 The Wyoming act is, otherwise,
substantively consistent with the FAA.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court did not outline all of the implications of its decision
in Southland; however, the Court clearly announced a policy favoring en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. 28 The Court held further that they
could find "nothing in the [FAA] indicating that the broad principle of
enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under State law. ' 279
The extent of preemption remains to be determined by the courts, but it is
important that attorneys review and be aware of the potential areas of their
state acts which may be superceded by the FAA.
272. TEx. REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 225 sec. A (Vernon 1973). This is con-
sistent with § 2 of the UAA. See UAA § 2 (1955).
273. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
274. TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 225 sec. E (Vernon 1966). This provision
is also included in the UAA. UAA § 5 (1955).
275. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1977).
276. Id. § 1-36-103. The UAA contains similar language.
277. See supra note 229.
278. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
279. Id. at 11.
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